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Not AvailableIntellectual humility (IH) is related to less political and religious polarization, so IH may help shed light on polarization broadly. That said, IH-polarization relations may differ depending on the belief domain or identity in question, which in turn raises important implications for applied work aimed at reducing polarization. Here we simultaneously examined political and religious affective polarization in relation to IH. Across belief domains (politics and religion) and identities (Republicans, Democrats, atheists, Christians), IH was consistently related to less affective polarization. These relations tended to remain significant even when controlling for belief strength. There was limited evidence, however, that IH statistically protected against variables that predict more polarization (e.g. moralization of beliefs). Altogether, these findings highlight pressing directions for future research that can uncover the constellation of variables that might mitigate polarization in those most likely to be polarized. 

When making social judgments, children prefer confidence over uncertainty. At the same time, they also value calibration and accuracy. How, then, do children reason about calibrated uncertainty, or intellectual humility, versus unwarranted confidence, or intellectual arrogance? Here we examined whether 4- to 11-year-olds evaluated intellectually humble individuals as more likable, more knowledgeable, nicer, and smarter than intellectually arrogant individuals. Across two studies involving 229 children (Study 1: N = 111, 59% White, 39% girls; Study 2: N = 118, 66% White, 49% girls), we found that children, by the age of 5.5 years, preferred an intellectually humble over an intellectually arrogant individual, with this preference strengthening over development. Moreover, children preferred intellectual humility over intellectual arrogance both when an intellectually humble individual appeared to be accurate (Study 1) and when it was unclear whether they were accurate (Study 2). Altogether, these findings indicate that children do not prioritize unwarranted confidence more than calibrated uncertainty in their social judgments. We conclude by highlighting pressing directions for future research surrounding what makes children prefer intellectual humility and why. 

Because an intellectually humble person is neither diffident nor arrogant in their views, intellectual humility (IH) is considered a virtuous mean. Yet, evidence for the virtuous mean account is mixed, with some studies finding evidence for it and some studies finding evidence against it. To clarify these ambiguities, we examined the curvilinear relations between multiple IH conceptualizations and belief strength across political, religious, and irreligious beliefs. In a secondary analysis of more than 4,000 participants, there was evidence for the virtuous mean account for political beliefs, evidence against it for religious beliefs, and little evidence for irreligious beliefs. Altogether, these results raise the possibility that the virtuous mean account of IH is not as generalizable as originally presumed. Thus, instead of asking whether IH is a virtuous mean, future research should ask when, why, and how IH is a virtuous mean for some beliefs and not for others.